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This study considers the effects of consuming late-night political humor on audience 
members’ individual-level affective political polarization. Existing literature suggests that many 
late-night comedy television programs already influence viewers’ political engagement, 
including voting likelihood and political talk likelihood. Programming like The Daily Show 
(TDS) employs satiric critique within broader parodic framework to engage audience members’ 
political identities. These identities are incredibly emotional and, combined with comedic 
capacity to provoke anger, exert significant influence over individual behavioral tendencies. 
Subsequently, it makes sense to consider the affectively polarizing capacity of these shows—
measured both by favorability, or ingroup confidence, and social distance, or hostility towards 
members of opposing political parties. This study implements experimental research design to 
test this theory, finding a mildly significant relationship between consumption of TDS and 
individual-level affective polarization that is heavily mitigated by a variety of other independent 
variables. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 Political polarization is the current most pressing threat to American democracy. It short-
circuits government, drains our economy, and kills public faith in key national institutions. 
Moreover, it directly affects our social-emotional behavior; some research even suggests that 
political polarization within families drastically impacts social interaction at holiday meals 
(Jilani 2018). Left unchecked, this political disease will bring our country to a standstill. 
 Coincidentally—or maybe uncoincidentally—the pronounced rise of American 
polarization parallels rapid evolution of national media consumption habits. This transformation 
is epitomized in the breakneck re-centering of political news content in entertainment media; an 
ever-growing number of young voters now turn to shows like Last Week Tonight and The Daily 
Show (TDS) for their political news rather than programming like CNN or NBC. Over a third of 
American youth now report consuming late-night political comedy television at least once a 
week; at the same time, political polarization has reached record highs (Baumgartner and Becker 
2018).  
This study attempts to consider these phenomena collectively, quantitatively defining the 
relationship between late-night political comedy consumption and viewers’ individual levels of 
affective political polarization. In the following chapter, I first briefly explain the foundational 
motivation for this project. I then justify my research, and delineate key terminology. I conclude 
with a summary outline of my experimental methodological design. 
Purpose 
Late-night political comedy television programs like TDS are often classified as 
‘infotainment’ or ‘soft news’ and, consequently, are excluded from discussion of news programs’ 
political rhetoric and impact. This study is intended to challenge that categorization by assessing 
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these programs’ structural formatting and testing for a direct relationship between content 
exposure and audience members’ individual-level affective polarization. This project will 
quantitatively analyze data collected via a survey experiment to measure the impact of TDS, one 
of the most popular American late-night political comedy television programs, on viewers’ 
affective political polarization (Baumgartner and Becker 2018). 
Rationales 
 Despite years of research concerning both late-night comedy television and political 
polarization, little has been done to define or test for any relationship between the two. Any 
attention given thus far to entertainment-based political media—or ‘soft news’—exclusively 
emphasizes late-night comedy programming’s impact on consumers’ political engagement. 
Though we consequently have an increased understanding of what this exposure means for 
audience members’ political knowledge, interest, and talk, we know very little about how it may 
affect their individual-level affective polarization (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009; Landreville et al. 
2011; Lee 2011; Moy et al. 2005). Moreover, political polarization is too often treated 
exclusively at an ideological or elite level—sometimes with focus on gerrymandered 
redistricting or similar political maneuvers—to the neglect of social-emotional considerations. 
This study fills that gap in knowledge by testing for a potential relationship between political 
comedy and affective political polarization. 
 Uncovering a link between consuming late-night comedy television and affective 
polarization is not the only motivator for this study. Traditional research concerning late-night 
comedy shows often also fails to consider different genres of comedy; satire and parody are 
decidedly different approaches to humor, and there must be a clear distinction made before any 
analysis can occur (Compton 2010; Hariman 2008). Studies concerning Saturday Night Live, for 
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instance, should not be treated or understood the same way as studies focusing on TDS (Warner 
2007). This project will both further clarify that distinction and focus on political satire—in the 
experimental design—to generate new and more accurate data.  
 Finally, an ever-increasing number of young voters are turning to late-night shows for 
political news, and it is important that we understand what this shift means for our broader 
American democracy (Baumgartner and Becker 2018). Pronounced polarization is essentially 
tribalism; we significantly disrupt and alter our national political culture when we isolate 
ourselves in like-minded groups. Legislative gridlock damages governmental function, costs us 
billions of dollars annually, and reduces public confidence in our institutions. Worse, the 
antagonistic restructuring of our political culture severely abbreviates and reforms our individual 
social lives. One recent study found that Thanksgiving dinners are significantly shorter in regions 
where Americans share family across party lines; researchers estimate that polarization 
eliminated 34 million hours of cross-partisan discourse in 2016 alone (Jilani 2018). Increased 
affective polarization will bring our nation to a standstill if left unchecked; this study serves as a 
foundation for future conflict resolution. 
Definitions 
 Not all late-night comedy is created equal. TDS and similar programs primarily couch 
satiric humor, or “the use of humor, irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and criticize,” in a 
parodic framework (Higgie 2017, p. 36). Parodic structure, defined as “the comic refunctioning 
of preformed linguistic or artistic material,” duplicates and mimics existing entities—in this case 
mainstream political news sources—to subtly undermine and jam popular culture (Hariman 
2008, p. 250). 
4 
 
 Affective polarization is a uniquely delineated element of broader political polarization. It 
refers to reinforced ingroup identity and outgroup hostility, both behavioral tendencies highly 
motivated by emotion. Consequently, affective polarization is operationalized in this study as 
especially reliant on anger and is generally defined both through favorability toward presented 
political content and through social distance from members of opposing political parties.  
Method 
 I created a survey experiment to test for a potential relationship between exposure to late-
night comedy and viewers’ levels of political polarization. Representatively sampling American 
citizens via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform, I randomly assigned two treatments. 
One group viewed a segment from TDS concerning President Trump’s border wall construction, 
while the other read an exact transcript of the same clip manipulatively attributed to CNN’s 
Anderson Cooper. Both factions then completed the same survey, designed to measure the effect 
of each respective treatment on individual-level affective polarization. Participants were 
compensated. Finally, I scaled and recorded survey question responses to reliably compare these 
two distinct data sets. 
Conclusion 
 Millions of Americans—myself included—regularly consume late-night political comedy 
television without once thinking about its possible influence over political behavior or thought 
processes. This is potentially catastrophic for our national democracy. The following study 
addresses that probability and quantitatively establishes a relationship between consumption of 
such programming and individual-level affective political polarization. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Relatively early in his polemical career, English poet and civil servant John Milton 
declared laughter and anger “the two most rational faculties of humane intellect” (Samuel 1972, 
p. 1). This connection serves as the grounding theoretical structure behind this study and, 
accordingly, is the primary consideration of this chapter. Comedic capacity to elicit anger 
suggests the genre is elementally imbued with the power to alter audience behavior; this 
emotional movement—alternately described as ‘affect’—is a distinct component of broader 
affective polarization. Such is the purpose of this study: to measure any relationship between 
consuming political comedic television content and individual-level audience members’ affective 
polarization. 
Humor is a pervasive and integral part of our daily life. It has become a part of many of 
our daily routines—we consume it in stand-up specials, the music we listen to, and the television 
shows we watch. Despite this almost quotidian prominence and relevance, however, the type of 
comedy we enjoy has varied wildly across the years. Recently, we have witnessed an exponential 
rise in the percentage of young American voters turning to late-night political comedy television 
as either their primary source of news or as a complement to mainstream news consumption. 
Moreover, researchers Moy et al. note measurable decline in traditional news outlet 
viewership—nightly network news, daily newspapers, and local television news outlets all report 
roughly ten percent drops in audience numbers even as late-night comedy viewership rises 
(2005). This paradigm shift has yet to be adequately addressed in either communication studies 
or political science literature. 
 Though myriad scholars have begun assessing the consequences of this new comedic era, 
the studies that do exist almost exclusively measure the effect of political humor on audience 
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engagement (e.g., Baek and Wojcieszak 2009). Such literature, consequently, often neglects the 
relationship between political identity and emotional or affective polarization. This study fills 
that gap in knowledge by explaining how the emotional interrelatedness of political identity and 
satirical comedy exacerbates viewers’ individual-level affective polarization. Here, late-night 
political comedy is epitomized in and measured with The Daily Show (TDS), and affective 
polarization is operationalized both in measurements of favorability and pronounced social 
distance. 
 In the following chapter, I synthesize and critique existing literature pertinent to my 
topic. This encompasses a range of specific concepts and theories, each of which is addressed in 
these next pages. First, I examine the emotional qualities inherent in political identity. Next, I 
provide a comprehensive rhetorical critique of comedy itself, especially considering its 
subversive political machinations. I then examine late-night political comedy television 
programming and its immediate political effects on audience behavior before clearly 
conceptualizing affective polarization. Finally, I explicitly delineate and construct the new 
theoretical framework that guides this project. 
Political Identity 
 Political identity is deeply emotional. This is not itself a groundbreaking revelation—
political ideology and partisanship are emotionally gladiatorial even on social media—but this 
fact is epistemologically critical to my study. 
 Social identity theory posits that an individual’s sense of collective identity arises from 
group membership, often creating an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality that is conceptually identical 
to political partisanship and party affiliation. Henri Tajfel’s 1979 realization that the groups to 
which people belong are an important source of pride and self-esteem is crucial to this study—
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the ingroups to which we belong employ emotion politically, regulating when and how we share 
our feelings such that we maintain and facilitate proper social group function (Huddy et al. 2015; 
Shields 2005). Essentially, those groups upon which we predicate our self-identity use emotion 
as a political tool to preserve and promote said identity; often, differentiation from the norms of 
disliked outgroups elicits peer approval and self-pride, while conformity to outgroup norms 
results in disapproval or shame (Suhay 2015). Consider, for instance, the immediate and explicit 
conflict often found in cross-partisan families—disconformity to familial political ingroup values 
often provokes terse disapproval or dislike. Political identity and emotional expressivity are so 
closely interrelated, in fact, that research suggests the average person can adequately predict 
another individual’s partisanship using only information visually extracted from the face 
(Peterson et al. 2018). 
 This political-emotional relationship underscores the relevance and prominence of 
affective polarization, as I discuss later in the chapter. Ideological differentiation and elite-level 
disagreement are also, notably, often subordinate to affective behavior.  
Comedic Rhetoric 
 Comedy is a communicative and markedly dialogic process. Such foundational 
understanding of the genre is important to this study; it is virtually impossible to truly employ 
fully nonnormative, quantitative research methods without this informational literature synthesis. 
Humor is primal. It persists throughout millennia and exists innately from birth (Ziv and 
Labelle 1984). Though early forms of comedy were limited and slapstick, entertainment quickly 
evolved to encompass a range of techniques and strategies. The following section considers the 
two most prominent genres of humor in contemporary society: parody and satire. Both are of 
vital importance to this study. Though late-night political comedy television routinely employs 
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satiric advocacy content, it is regularly framed in a parodic format mimicking the presentation of 
mainstream or ‘hard’ news media. 
Forms of Comedy: Parody and Satire 
 Generally, it is understood that there are two hegemonic forms or genres of comedy—
parody and satire (Compton 2010; Hariman 2008; Warner 2007). Though these genres initially 
seem to share many characteristics, they differ both in foundational purpose and structure; the 
two are employed differently to accomplish distinctly different ends. 
 The word ‘parody’ itself translates directly to “beside the song” (Hariman 2008). 
Fittingly, the form is predicated on exaggerated mimicry; parody is the act of taking an item or 
situation and reproducing it humorously through duplicity or embellishment (Hariman 2008). 
This remediation or reproduction refracts society back on itself, extracting elements we find 
confusing or funny and magnifying them (Hariman 2008). It is a process that strips targets of 
individuality, turning their actions into cartoonish caricature and consequently removing the 
gravitas of original performance. It also reveals fundamental truths about individuals or events 
previously couched in behavioral mannerism and verbose rhetoric—essentially, parody is 
elementally concerned with the destabilization of hegemonic norms (in keeping with the 
subversive nature of comedic entertainment). Parody occurs frequently even in daily social 
interaction, but The Colbert Report is arguably the pinnacle of this comedic form, in which late-
night comedy host Stephen Colbert adopts the persona of a radical, far-right conservative 
intellectual. When considering the Iraq War in one segment, for instance, Colbert tells his 
audience that “doubts can happen to everyone, including me, but as a responsible journalist, I’ve 
taken my doubts, fears, moral compass, conscience, and all-pervading skepticism about the very 
nature of this war and simply placed them in this empty Altoids box” (Warner 2007, p. 24). 
9 
 
Mocking his targets—conservative journalists—by exaggerating confusing or hypocritical 
features of their public appearance, Colbert employs parodic humor to reveal the absurdity of the 
situation. Here, as is often the case with parody, the comedic reproduction of a real message or 
action demonstrates the simple fundamental truth that “public media and democratic politics 
alike are delusional, hopelessly self-absorbed, [and] pathetically conventional” (Hariman 2008, 
p. 272). 
 Satiric humor, our second comedic form, is decidedly more complex. This form employs 
irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and critique stupidity or vice, and is often politically 
oriented. There are two key types of satire: Horatian and Juvenalian. Horatian satire is often self-
directed, emphasizing playfulness and laughter. Because lighthearted self-critique ameliorates 
reputation (or approval ratings), this comedic subgenre is commonly employed by those 
attempting to seem warm or engaging (Warner 2007). Even definitionally, self-directed humor 
offers the user an opportunity to “ridicule [their] own behavior in a light-hearted and engaging 
way,” connecting with the audience on a personal level. Psychological research concerning 
Horatian humor suggests it is often seen as “genuinely funny” because it promotes solidarity, 
encourages viewers to take matters less seriously, and humanizes authority figures (Becker and 
Haller 2014, p. 43). Consequently, politicians often use Horatian satire to maximize their 
likeability among viewers different from the traditional mainstream news audience. Al Gore, for 
instance, harnessed these shows’ power in the 2000 presidential elections to boost his approval 
ratings and popular support (Young 2006). Antithetical to its counterpart, Juvenalian humor is 
other-directed and emphasizes aggression and judgment in scathing critique of everyday life 
(Becker and Haller 2014). This is the chosen comedic subgenre of most late-night political 
comedy television hosts because of its short-term capacity to provoke agreement among 
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viewers—in line, in certain regards, with functional social identity theory (2014). Additionally, 
Juvenalian humor is virtually always employed to create mental or behavioral change, as ironic 
or comedic criticism serves almost exclusively to identify and correct existing problems 
(Hariman 2008; Hart 2013; Lee 2011). 
 Understanding these comedic forms’ tandem capacity to influence an audience 
emotionally and behaviorally is a critical component of this study. Though the overarching 
parodic framework of late-night comedy television is important to appropriately contextualize its 
programming, it is the satiric content that most directly affects an audience. Political satire is 
shown to elicit distinct feelings of anger, which can have repercussions for political engagement 
and behavior (Chen et al. 2017; Hoon and Kwak 2014; Samual 1972). Anger produces both a 
sense of entitlement and a sense that a perpetrator has intentionally harmed or threatened that 
which we care about, generating a self-righteous certainty and sense of control along with 
confidence in one’s ingroup and its ability to fight back (Aristotle 1954; Brader 2012; Shields 
2005; Stevens 2002). This emotional reaction to satiric humor is explicitly considered further in 
this chapter’s concluding section, but is important to recognize as we proceed with this study. 
Furthermore, satire and parody are different from “traditional punchline-oriented late-night 
comedy” in format, common content, and political consequences (Hoffman and Young 2011, p. 
163). Significant differences exist, that is, between satiric and parodic programs like TDS or Last 
Week Tonight and stand-up comedy specials such as John Mulaney’s The Comeback Kid or 
Kevin Hart’s Irresponsible. We cannot—and should not—lump all late-night comedy 
programming together as ‘soft news’ or ‘infotainment.’ 
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Subversive Comedic Intent 
 All comedy, regardless of genre or context, is created with subversive intent (Hariman 
2008; Warner 2007; Young 2006). Parodic humor, as discussed, instrumentally reveals 
situational truth through duplicitous embellishment or neutralization of gravitas. Satire, 
concordantly, exposes societal flaws through either self-deprecating or biting critique. The 
subversive intent of both comedic genres is evident; though not limited to any specific usage, 
both satire and parody lend themselves strongly to political employment. 
 Indeed, political humor is demonstrably subversive. Television programs like TDS exist 
to disrupt and expose mainstream political media, alternatively interpreting events and 
individuals to ‘jam’ the hegemonic message (Warner 2007). These shows succeed by using 
“emotional and aesthetic modalities similar to those employed by political branding itself,” 
essentially creating parodic messaging to reveal the limitations and shortcomings of the hard 
news to which we are constantly exposed (Warner 2007, p. 19). Consider, for instance, the work 
of media activist Kalle Lasn. Lasn’s digital project (www.adbusters.org) routinely runs multiple 
“subvertisement” campaigns employing alternative imagery within traditional branding 
technology format and design layout. “A well-produced print ‘subvertisement,’” Lasn writes, 
“Mimics the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the classic double-take as viewers realize 
what they’re seeing is the very opposite of what they expected” (Lasn, 2000, p. 131). 
 Subversive messaging is appealing because it is couched in cynical realism, encouraging 
audience members to feel self-righteous anger and self-gratifying satisfaction that they are too 
clever to blindly follow societal hegemony. Late-night television hosts use Oz-like political 
models to “throw back the curtain on serial deceptions,” using their platform to present a world 
where unseen forces attempt to manipulate and deceive us daily (Hart 2013, p. 347; Hmielowski 
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2011). TDS, especially, epitomizes this model. In one memorable installment, ex-host Jon 
Stewart suggests that we must “give up the pipe dream once and for all that an inspirational 
leader can challenge the status quo.” Rather, we are “number one in aspiring political leaders 
telling us how great we are,” so we should have monthly political conventions in every state and 
inject billions into the “balloon-drop, straw-hat, and dead escort-removal industries” (as qtd. in 
Hart 2013, p. 349). Such rhetoric is designed to elicit audience members’ self-gratifying 
confidence in their own cleverness, while its emphasis on political rhetoric and strategy lowers 
our general trust in government (Hart 2013). Stewart frequently invokes such political motive to 
remind audiences that politicians are often underhanded or self-serving. 
 Established literature concerning humor also identifies four common dimensions of an 
individual’s affinity for humor (Becker and Haller 2014; Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle 
1984). The first emphasizes the importance of incongruent information—certain individuals 
default to comedic response, often in the face of either the unexpected or socially contradictory. 
This dimension contains two key sub-concepts: understanding of societal norms, and an 
understanding of what is ‘actually’ funny. An individual must comprehend cultural and societal 
expectations in order to recognize inconsistencies, but simultaneously will only identify middling 
incongruency as funny. That is, individuals generally do not ascribe comedic value to 
inconsistencies that stray too far in either direction (Hmielowski 2011). 
 The second dimension is superiority. This dimension is most applicable to Juvenalian 
satire, as it deals with the aggressive or hostile function of humor; audiences often ascribe greater 
comedic value to those jokes or events that supply them with feelings of superiority. As an 
established approach to identifying unacceptable behavior, other-directed humor is often used to 
mask perceived insecurities or inadequacy (Ziv and Labelle 1984). Consequently, political 
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comedians and satirists routinely joke at the expense of certain individuals and party 
establishments, for “laughing at the mistakes of others allows individuals to feel more secure 
with their own beliefs and removes insecurities they may have about their own behaviors or 
preferred political group” (Hmielowski 2011, p. 99). This dimension is interrelated with social 
identity theory, as previously contextualized by political identity. 
 The third common dimension of affinity for humor is grounded in socially awkward 
situations. In such environments, comedy is used to alleviate tension, almost as a defense 
mechanism (Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle 1984). This dimension reminds us that humor 
can be instrumental in reducing anxiety; in a political context, it elicits assuredness and 
comfortability in our own political ideology. 
 The final dimension demonstrates humor’s social capacity. We use comedy to connect 
with each other; research shows that individuals often seek out others they find funny 
(Hmielowski 2011). Social bonds are formed in dialogic agreement over what is subjectively 
funny, and often other-directed humor targeting elite individuals or groups is a powerful uniter. 
The classic inside joke, as well, can strengthen relationships between certain individuals 
(Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle 1984). 
Mediated Political Comedy 
 Having attained an understanding of comedic form and its subversive nature, we must 
now consider the distinct preferred content presented to us in late-night comedy television: 
political humor. Though most existing literature concerning the immediate consequences of 
political comedy begins with an initial appraisal of audience demographics—such as prior 
political knowledge, pre-existing interest, and audience ideology—this section will begin with a 
preliminary discussion of format. Structurally, parodic programming influences audience 
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understanding of satiric content, promoting emotionality, which serves as the connection 
between political humor and consequent affective behavioral tendencies. It is only after this 
examination of format that audience demographics will be identified, after which I will consider 
the immediate consequences of consuming late-night comedy, including increases in political 
discussion, knowledge, and guest popularity.  
Format 
 As previously discussed, the parodic structure of late-night political comedy television is 
intended to ‘culture jam,’ or subvert hegemonic messaging from mainstream news media 
(Warner 2007). Programs like TDS only make sense within this format, as a twisted mimicry of 
traditional, hardline news. Consequently, these shows are structurally similar to those one might 
find on a large, traditional network. Warner notes, for instance, that “watching the show with the 
volume turned down might not alert you to the fact that this is anything other than one of the 
myriad news options now available” (2007, p. 24). This overarching parodic framework 
comedically contextualizes the content, enclosing any Juvenalian satiric content in lighthearted 
atmosphere. 
 This parodic structure does give way to important deviation, however. Though late-night 
comedy television programs share elemental and indispensable structure with traditional 
programming—‘straight’ delivery of news, often via monologue, followed by panel discussion 
or guest interview—hosts operate on a more conversational or dialogic model of communication. 
The hybrid political interview model, a broadcast news format in which the journalist is 
positioned not just as investigator but as socio-political advocate, offers audience members an 
“escape from the reality of a hyper-partisan political climate and the reliance on mainstream 





 It may come as no surprise that late-night comedy television programming often caters to 
an overwhelmingly young audience (Young 2006). This demographic affinity for such content is 
partially motivated by the negative correlation between age and political knowledge, and it 
bolstered by ingrained media consumption habits (older citizens are exponentially more likely to 
consume those mainstream news outlets they grew up with). 
 Late-night political comedy television audiences are also often well-educated, though 
some research suggests a large percentage of viewers tune in for pure entertainment value (Baek 
and Wojcieszak 2009; LaMarre and Walthers 2015; Moy et al. 2005). This educational 
background and pre-existing political knowledge are important when considering the polarizing 
consequences of political comedy consumption. 
 Finally, liberal or Democratic partisans are far more likely to watch TDS and similar 
programming (“Section 4”). This is primarily because these shows often feature liberal hosts and 
tend to critique or ridicule conservative political figures and policies. 
Consumption Consequences 
Exposure to late-night comedy television programming significantly influences audience 
members’ political engagement. This influence manifests in myriad tangible behavioral 
consequences including increased discussion of politics with likeminded conversational partners, 
increased general political knowledge, the creation of affective positive negativity—upbeat 
conceptualization of downbeat news or content—and favorable perceptions of guest candidates. 
In the following paragraphs, I account for each of these political behavioral corollaries. 
Those who regularly consume late-night political humor do engage in political talk with 
more individuals more often, but they also show a heightened tendency to talk with people who 
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share their political ideology (Landreville and LaMarre 2011; Lee 2012; Moy et al. 2005). 
Summarily, these viewers often fail to engage with members of their respective opposing 
political parties, preferring instead to interact with those who hold the same partisan views. 
Scholar Hoon Lee demonstrated this behavior in one notable study that utilized existing mail 
surveys and conducted a separate experiment (2012). Lee gathered experimental data from a 
2011 online experiment originally conducted by the research firm Qualtrics. Of the 2,301 adult 
panelists invited, 861 agreed to participate, and 758 successfully completed the experiment. 
These participants were chosen randomly and represented a range of sexes, median household 
incomes, education levels, ethnicities, and partisan identities. After giving consent, individuals 
were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: one group watched a short clip from TDS 
including several segments on a recent government bailout of big companies, while the second 
viewed a compilation of NBC’s Nightly News clips on the same subject. Both videos presented 
the same basic content—the Treasury Secretary’s appearance at a Congressional hearing—and 
were the same length. The third group, a control group, watched a neutral segment covering a 
new Disney Resort in Orlando. After the experiment, every participant completed a questionnaire 
measuring their “emotions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions” regarding the economy. With 
each response coded on a scale, the findings were conclusive: consuming late-night comedy has 
little effect on viewers’ willingness to discuss politics with non-likeminded others (Lee 2012, p. 
656). 
Literature also suggests that late-night comedy television programs increase viewers’ 
general political knowledge (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009). However, the same research indicates 
that exposure to late-night comedy television is only associated with “increases in relatively easy 
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political knowledge” and has virtually no influence on consumers’ political knowledge about 
more complex or difficult issues (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009, p. 795). 
Often, political comedy teaches audiences valuable critical reasoning skills through 
creation of an emotional or affective response. Late-night political comedy programming shares 
the same subversive intent with its genre counterparts; consequently, many program hosts strive 
to highlight the gap between idealism and realism (Lee 2012; Pfau 2007). Consider, for instance, 
Trevor Noah’s evisceration of President Trump’s border wall construction; juxtaposing the 
President’s early comments about impenetrability with recent reports of breaches emphasizes the 
disparity. This ‘positive negativity,’ as it is often called, teaches audiences critical reasoning 
skills essential to participatory democracy by creating a distinctly affective response—harsh 
Juvenalian criticism elicits anger from an audience, affecting behavioral tendencies one way, 
while light-hearted Horatian presentation increases “viewers’ sense of self-efficacy” (Lee 2011, 
p. 7). 
Programs like TDS also routinely invite candidates to the show for guest appearances. 
This can have direct and immediate consequences on audience members’ perceptions of these 
public figures; candidates who acknowledge and cooperate with parodic imitation (like that of 
Saturday Night Live, Between Two Ferns, or TDS) often enjoy a substantial boost in ratings 
(Young 2006). Presidential willingness to engage with Saturday Night Live (SNL) 
impersonations, especially, have profound positive effects on individuals’ popularity. Presidents 
Gerald Ford, George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and Barack Obama all enjoyed higher 
approval ratings after cooperating with their SNL comedic counterparts (Compton 2010; Higgie 
2017). The persuasive power of late-night comedy television over an audience is again evident 
here and is something to be mindful of as we progress with this study. 
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While four measurable consequences of viewing late-night comedy television exist—
increased political discussions with likeminded conversational partners, heightened general 
knowledge of politics, creation of positive negativity, and positive perceptions of political figures 
who cooperate—these consequences are often mediated by viewers’ preexisting value systems, 
including both partisan ideology and political interest/prior knowledge (Arpan et al. 2009; 
Becker and Haller 2014; LaMarre and Walthers 2015). That is, the effects of consuming late-
night comedy are strengthened or weakened by audience members’ personal identities. 
The first mediator is straightforward; political comedy television programming is broadly 
perceived as liberally biased (Arpan et al. 2009). Controlling for viewer partisanship, researchers 
are still uncovering nuances in this media bias phenomenon. For instance, Republican consumers 
are less likely to embrace mediated messaging from any outlet, but they also perceive less bias in 
Fox News’ coverage of conservative politicians than in that of late-night comedy television 
programming (Arpan et al. 2009). Essentially, viewer partisanship plays an enormous role in 
mediating the political effects of exposure to late-night political humor (Xenos et al. 2009; 
LaMarre and Walthers 2015). Moreover, consumers are “more likely to appreciate comedy that 
targets an individual or group toward which they feel a negative affect” (Becker and Haller 2014, 
p. 36). This research extends social identity theory to late-night comedy television programming, 
once again confirming the power of ingroup and outgroup norms. 
Political interest and prior knowledge also critically mediate the effects of late-night 
comedy consumption. Communication studies scholars and political scientists often divide these 
audiences into two distinct groups: those with political interest and prior knowledge, and the 
inattentive public (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009; LaMarre and Walthers 2015; Moy et al. 2005). 
The term ‘inattentive public’ refers to those who tune in purely out of curiosity or for 
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entertainment value but lack a particularly strong prior interest in the content or broader political 
context. Political humor influences the inattentive public much more strongly than it does the 
informed public; Heather LaMarre and Whitney Walthers found in one 2013 study that 
inattentive voters who consume soft news—like late-night comedy programs—are not only more 
likely to vote, but to display higher levels of political interest after watching. This relationship is 
partially facilitated by both individual smug satisfaction at ‘getting’ a joke, which generates 
positive affect that increases desire to further engage, and the Dunning Kruger Effect (a 
cognitive bias in which people assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is).  
Affective Polarization 
Partisan gridlock is a real phenomenon. Too often, however, academic consideration of 
polarization exists at an ideological or elite level and neglects consideration of the affective or 
social-emotional aspects of such behavior. This is a distinct mistake, especially considering 
recent polarizing behavioral tendencies among the American public. One 2014 Pew Research 
Center survey epitomized this trend, finding that 15 percent of Democratic and 17 percent of 
Republican respondents were unhappy with the idea of an immediate family member marrying 
someone of the opposing party. This mutual dislike is much higher than it ever has been before 
and extends even into quotidian life—we socially distance ourselves from opposing partisans 
through spending habits, romantic decisions, and even official organizational membership 
(Iyengar et al. 2012). In the following paragraphs, I will both define affective polarization and 
briefly review contemporary motivation for such behavioral trends. 
 Though pronounced affective polarization is a distinctly recent American political 
phenomenon—despite flurries of historically similar national behavior—it is not in and of itself a 
new concept. Campbell et. al originally connected political identity with emotional behavior in 
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1960, noting that while ideological membership strongly influences partisan choice, affect has an 
equal (if not stronger) effect on partisan bonding. Moreover, those who strongly identify with a 
distinct political party are highly unlikely to break that partisan bond even if the party’s ideology 
changes, further suggesting emotional affect plays a crucial role in broader polarization. 
Coalescence of political identity with social identity has increased dramatically in just the past 
few decades, creating an aggressively hostile electorate fragmented into radicalized parties 
despite broadly common individual ideological positioning (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2013; 
Mason 2014). 
 The American press corps epitomizes the wholesale affective polarization currently 
plaguing our nation. Partisan media outlets have expanded rapidly in recent years and now 
dominate the American cable news market. These programs’ rise in popularity parallels 
intensifying national political polarization, causing scholars to examine public attachment to 
partisan media. These researchers have and do repeatedly emphasize the increasingly diverse and 
partisan media environment as a causal mechanism (Levendusky 2013). Consumers now have 
unprecedented choice in the media they consume—selective exposure is a well-documented 
phenomenon at this point—and consequently emphasis is placed on the effects of this 
personalized consumption on political polarization (Iyenger et al. 2012; Levedusky 2013). 
Partisan media are consumed most frequently by likeminded viewers on either end of the 
political spectrum; scholar Levendusky found that viewing like-minded media reinforces 
attitudes and radicalizes audiences, with effects lasting several days (2013). This confirmation 
directly facilitates affective polarization since the ability to engage selectively with like-minded 




 Moreover, exposure to messaging that contradicts or directly attacks one’s worldview 
often pushes consumers to retreat into their existing beliefs and values. This phenomenon, 
colloquially dubbed the ‘backfire effect,’ is influential in research challenging personal opinions 
(Nyhan and Reifer 2010). Still, the consequences of consuming opposite-minded or crosscutting 
media are not as pronounced as the consequences of consuming likeminded media. This is 
primarily because exposure to crosscutting media causes viewers to disregard both presented 
information and the source itself, whereas exposure to likeminded media bolsters audineces’ 
confidence in their political values and beliefs (Levendusky 2013). 
 Political polarization is powered by systemic issues like gerrymandered redistricting and 
by contributing factors like elite conflict and ideological difference, but is in essence an affective 
phenomenon. This understanding is important both to my study holistically and to the creation of 
a distinctly new theoretical framework. 
Theoretical Construction 
 Holistic consideration of political identity (and social identity theory), comedic rhetoric, 
and late-night political comedy television allows us to construct a working theory through which 
we may proceed. It follows such: emotional identities, if critiqued or attacked, produce affective 
response. Moreover, critiques couched in satire specifically produce anger as audiences perceive 
harm, losses, and threats or uncertainty about the outcome of a specific situation (Bredvold 1940; 
Sienkiewicz 2018). This perception consequently encourages us to adjust our behavior 
defensively such that we reduce uncertainty and increase personal control, often retreating to an 
ingroup’s norms and expectations at the expense of an outgroup (Aristotle 1954; Brader 2012, 
Landreville and LaMarre 2011; Stephens 2013). Hostile or Juvenalian satire especially, in which 
other-directed targets are humiliated and/or insulted, promotes aggression. Researchers 
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Weinstein, Hodgins, and Ostvik-White tell us clearly that “enjoying others’ misfortune is an 
indirect and acceptable way for socialized individuals to express aggression without incurring the 
self or social censure associated with direct aggression….Although hostile humor is socially 
acceptable, it nonetheless is aggressive behavior” (2011, p. 1048). Certain specific joke 
structures, as well, directly provoke decidedly negative emotion (Chan 2014). Concordantly, 
voters who identify strongly with a distinct political party experience anger more readily 
(Groenendyk and Banks 2014). 
 I propose a positive, direct relationship between exposure to late-night political humor 
and individual-level consumer affective polarization. Political identity’s elemental emotional 
quality interrelates directly with affective behavior, especially when coupled with Juvenalian 
satiric capacity to elicit further anger, and so relevant programming should have strong political 
consequences for its audiences. My distinct proposition is that these consequences amalgamate 
in affective political polarization; the anger generated by parodic ‘culture jamming’ messages 
reinforces affective behavioral tendencies and facilitates affective polarization. 
 Affective polarization should be observed regardless of participants’ individual 
partisanship, even as strong partisans are expected to experience the phenomenon more strongly. 
Though late-night political comedy television overwhelmingly caters to liberal viewers through 
other-directed jokes targeting conservative politicians and policies, this political partiality will 
serve to entrench and radicalize Democratic audience members further in their own ideology. 
Concordantly, conservative response to crosscutting threatened values will force consumers back 
into their own ingroup, consequently lowering the demographic’s willingness to engage in 
dialogic communication outside their party. Essentially, both parties’ members should 
experience observably increased levels of affective polarization. 
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 Alloying the deeply rooted emotionality of political identity with the satirical capacity to 
provoke anger affords us unique insight into the enormous influence late-night political comedy 
television exerts over its audiences’ behavioral tendencies. This emotional quality—or affect—is 
a crucial component of affective polarization; late-night political comedy consisting primarily of 
other-directed political satire designed to provoke anger either confirms and validates like-
minded viewers or forces tangible behavioral response taken to neutralize the threat. Affective 
polarization, defined by mutual dislike and social distance, is an evident product of this process.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study considers the effect of consuming late-night political satiric content on 
audiences’ affective polarization. The primary independent variable is varied content delivery (or 
treatment), operationalized here as either exposure to a TDS clip or a verbatim written transcript 
manipulatively attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper. The dependent variable is individual-level 
affective polarization, or polarization embedded in favorability and social distance measurement 
rather than purely ideological disagreement. There are no true moderating or confounding 
variables in this study; literature suggests that a relationship should be observed regardless of 
audience orientation or demographic. 
 Informed by existing research relevant to my study, my hypothesis predicted a positive 
linear relationship between exposure to late-night political comedy and individual-level audience 
affective polarization. This hypothesis and its corresponding null hypothesis are as follows: 
H1: Consumption of late-night political comedy television, such as TDS, heightens or  
      exacerbates audiences’ individual-level affective political polarization. 
H0: There is absolutely no relationship between consumption of late-night political  
      comedy television, such as TDS, and audiences’ individual-level affective political  
      polarization. 
Experimental Design 
 To test this hypothesis, I employed an experimental survey design. Experimental 
methodology allows for high internal validity—meaning cause and effect can be better 
isolated—as well as minute, systematic control of conditions and variables, allowing researchers 
to better tailor structural design to specific research. Experimental designs are also repeatable, 
which ensures results can be retried under a myriad of external conditions to validate and verify 
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findings. These three advantages benefitted my project, and allowed me to draw concrete causal 
conclusions about my hypothetical relationship. 
 Each methodological approach does, of course, have certain disadvantages as well. 
Experimental designs are often low in external validity, meaning results cannot always be 
generalized to a broader population. I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users to address 
this challenge—though not perfect, as I explain momentarily, MTurk often helps alleviate 
external validity issues by providing access to a representatively large and diverse user base. 
This platform also resolved a second flaw with my experimental methodology: lack of control 
over external variables. Online surveys, such as the one conducted here, do not account for 
setting, mood, or any number of other factors that can potentially influence participant response. 
The scale of my sample diminished these concerns. Employing a real TDS clip additionally 
enhanced external validity, accurately reflecting real mediated content in a way that a mock 
video would not. Finally, the artificial nature of many experimental designs often interferes with 
results; consumption of TDS in my experimental design was markedly different than regular, 
normal exposure to the show. 
Primary Independent Variable 
 To successfully operationalize my independent variable, I exposed participants in my 
study to a specific late-night comedy television program. I chose to incorporate clips from TDS 
for two specific reasons: first, no research has focused on the show since Trevor Noah’s debut as 
host, and second, the show’s comedic form is typical of the genre (employing pronounced 
Juvenalian satiric humor couched in a broader parodic structure).  
Participants randomly assigned the treatment viewed a three-minute TDS clip 
comedically critiquing construction of a Southern border wall. Though I originally intended to 
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include both this clip and a similar clip discussing the same issue from a conservative 
perspective, I ultimately decided this would not be reflective of the current late-night political 
comedy landscape, which trends overwhelmingly liberal (Moy et al. 2005; Warner 2007). In the 
chosen segment, Trevor Noah juxtaposes Trump’s original claims about border wall 
impenetrability with recent reports of smugglers routinely breaching construction, emphasizing 
comically disparate expectations with reality (selected still images from this clip are shown 
below in Table 3.3). This brief clip is linked here, with a full transcript available in the attached 
Appendix. 
Table 3.3—TDS Treatment Images 
 
I also included a treatment designed to measure the relationship between more objective 
news consumption and individual-level audience political polarization. This treatment 
manifested as a verbatim transcript of the TDS clip, and provided comparative value to measure 
any existing relationship between general news consumption and affective polarization. This 
narrative appears below and is also included in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.4—Narrative (attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper) 
ANDERSON COOPER: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump, 
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how 
impenetrable his border wall is.  
 
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said 
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like 
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all 
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through 
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need 
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?  
 
COOPER: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall 
because if the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by 
yelling, ‘Marco’ and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t 
named Marco. A lot of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal 
voice): But, yes, on Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can 
get through his wall. And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh, 
well, cut right to the next scene.  
 
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly 
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known 
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when 
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete 
barriers within minutes.  
 
COOPER: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that 
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at 
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the 
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they 
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah, 
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle 
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch. 
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think 
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable 
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people 
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s 
response.  
 
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh, 
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s 
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk 




COOPER: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be 
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In 
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally 
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also, 
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it 
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed. 
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border. 
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close 
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!” 
 
Dependent Variable 
 I observed and measured the study’s dependent variable—individual-level affective 
polarization—in two distinct categories. I operationalized the first, favorability, through ‘feeling 
thermometer’ questions about people and policies presented in messaging. Each thermometer 
asked participants to rate their feelings towards three distinct subjects on a one-to-100 scale. I 
operationalized the second subcategory, social distance, through questions designed to measure 
participant attitudes in partisan-related social situations. I considered these two distinct aspects of 
affective polarization collectively, as per existing research methodology. These questions are as 
follows: 
Table 3.5—Affective Polarization Measurement 
 
Favorability  2. How do you feel about President Trump? 1-100 feeling thermometer  
    scale.  
3. How do you feel about President Trump’s border wall construction? 1- 
    100 feeling thermometer scale.  
4. How do you feel about Trevor Noah? 1-100 feeling thermometer scale. 
 
Social Distance 5. How high a threat do you think your opposing political party poses to  
    our country? Extremely low/moderately low/nonexistent or  
    unsure/moderately high/extremely high.  
6. How comfortable would you be with your child or a close family  
    member marrying someone from your opposing political party?  
    Extremely uncomfortable/moderately uncomfortable/neither  
    uncomfortable nor comfortable/moderately comfortable/extremely  
    comfortable.  
7. How often do you consider the partisanship of potential connections  
    when establishing friendships or relationships?  
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    Never/infrequently/unsure/frequently/always.  
8. How confident are you in your opposing political party’s ability to lead  
    our country? Extremely unconfident/moderately unconfident/neutral/ 
    moderately confident/extremely confident.  
9. How likely are you to discuss this issue with a member of your  
    opposing political party? Extremely unlikely/somewhat unlikely/neither  
    unlikely nor likely/somewhat likely/extremely likely. 
 
Content Control and Demographics 
 To ensure those completing my experimental survey gave attention to their assigned 
treatment, I included an easy control question about the message theme. Those incorrect answers 
were segregated, and responses for these surveys were not aggregated into my larger data set. 
My experimental design included a brief series of demographic questions. These 
questions emphasized and reinforced the value of random assignment; this section of the survey 
confirmed the validity of my response set. Random assignment ensured that members of each 
treatment group were the same, confirming realistically representative samples. I modelled these 
questions on existing research measures—specifically LaMarre et al.’s work—and asked 
participants about distinct identities. I chose to eliminate certain items I deemed irrelevant to my 
own research, as my experimental model did not account for intervening or antecedent variables. 
The included control questions were as follows below. 
Table 3.6—Content & Demographics Measurement 
 
Content  1. Which of the following best describes the issue addressed in this news  
    messaging? Obamacare is failing; smugglers are breaking through  
    President Trump’s border wall; impeachment hearings are delayed;      
    economic downturn is killing small businesses. 
 
Demographics           10. How old are you, in years? Fill in the blank. 
             11. How often do you watch The Daily Show or other satirical news  
    programs? Frequently/often/sometimes/rarely/never.  
          12. Choose the option that best describes your political affiliation. Strong  
    Democrat/leans Democrat/independent or unaffiliated/leans  





 Rather than rely on College of Wooster students to complete my experimental research 
design, I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. MTurk is billed as a “marketplace 
for work that requires human intelligence” and allows users to complete brief tasks for minute 
compensation—in this case, completing a short survey. MTurk is one of the best platforms for 
quickly gathering large and diverse samples, and is incredibly cost-effective. The website 
additionally allows researchers to overcome many of the concerns about the usual undergraduate 
demographic—often characterized as Western, educated, affluent, and liberal—by controlling 
conditional characteristics. MTurk also has its flaws, of course. Participants are not always 
attentive; the financial incentive to complete as many tasks as possible means many neglect 
careful consideration of questions. Users also skew young, further affecting random sampling. 
Still, these disadvantages are easily addressed with content manipulation checks and conditional 
participant qualifications. 
 Participants were linked to the accordant Qualtrics survey and subsequently shown a 
consent form informing them both of their rights and the benefits of completing said survey. 
Further, respondents were informed that only American citizens over the age of 18 would be 
permitted to take the survey. If participants gave their consent to these conditions, they were 
directed to the questionnaire. 
 Participants were then immediately asked either to view or read their randomly assigned 
treatment. The goal was to simulate a traditional viewing experience without priming 
participants to consider content in a specific way. Following this content consumption, 
participants were asked to complete an evaluation designed to measure their affective 
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polarization. The survey ended with sequential demographic questions and a debrief elaborating 
the purpose of the study. MTurk users were compensated $0.25 upon completion of the survey. 
Analysis 
 I conducted several statistical analyses—including comparison of means, chi-squared 
tests, bivariate regressions, and multivariate regressions—to assess my data. I originally expected 
a positive, statistically significant relationship between exposure to TDS (my independent 
variable) and audience members’ individual-level affective polarization (my dependent variable). 
These completed analyses allowed me to concretely test this hypothesis, as discussed further in 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
 This section is the apex of this study; the following pages clearly and concisely answer 
my research question and begin to resolve my project. In the following chapter, I first 
descriptively summarize the response to my experimental survey. I then outline my statistical 
methodology, explicitly describing my work in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), 
before briefly summarizing analysis output.  
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Once published on Amazon’s MTurk marketplace, my survey garnered 707 total 
responses. Each participant received $0.25 upon survey completion. Of the initial recorded 
responses, 200 were incomplete. I eliminated these, narrowing my valid sample size to 507. I 
then excluded 43 responses from noncitizens and five responses from underage (younger than 18 
years old) MTurk users. I also removed responses from the 101 participants who incorrectly 
answered my manipulation check question asking about the basic content of their treatment—
indicating that their answers were unreliable—as well as the 85 respondents who self-reported 
Independent or neutral partisanship, reflecting their ultimately extraneous relevance to any study 
concerning two-party partisan polarization. Ultimately, I winnowed my data to 273 complete, 
usable responses (n=273). 
 In all, 142 participants watched the late-night comedy treatment clip critiquing Trump’s 
border wall construction; 131 read the transcript attributed to Anderson Cooper. Approximately 
190 respondents identified themselves as Democrats, while just 83 identified as Republican. 
Respondents recorded an average age (as a calculated mean) of 35.77 years, with 12.21 standard 
deviation. Participants reported watching late-night political comedy television at a 2.84 mean—
meaning the average respondent consumed that content just a little less infrequently than 
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‘sometimes’—with 1.14 standard deviation. These descriptive statistics correspond incredibly 
closely to the broader demographics of Amazon MTurk users, which skew younger, liberal, and 
more likely to regularly consume news media (“Mechanical Turkers”). 
Independent Variables 
 
Each treatment group reported approximately the same descriptive independent variable 
measurements. Simple comparison of means indicated virtually identical participant 
demographics—the average respondent assigned the treatment video was 35.73 years old (with 
11.72 standard deviation); the average respondent assigned the written transcript was 35.82 years 
old (with 12.77 standard deviation). The mean media consumption among those who watched 
the TDS clip was 2.87 (with 1.13 standard deviation); it was 2.8 (with 1.15 standard deviation) 
among those who read the transcript. Further statistical analysis confirmed similarities between 
each treatment group’s partisan composition as well (with a 2.356 chi-square value). 
In other words, participants in both groups were decidedly young, reported that they 
sometimes watched late-night comedy television in their daily routines, and were split equally by 
partisanship. This close interrelatedness allowed both better comparison and opportunity for 
individual variable isolation. 
Dependent Variables 
 
 Earlier in my study, I segmented affective polarization into two distinct elements: 
favorability and social distance. I chose to do so to match existing surveys and studies in the 
field. Surprisingly, however, these components did not appear to be the most reliable 
measurements of affective polarization; these shortcomings and limitations are discussed further 
in the next chapter. 
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Those who viewed the treatment video reported a mean favorability rating of 49.36 (with 
3.5915 standard deviation), and a mean social distance rating of 3.59 (with 0.89 standard 
deviation). Those who read the transcript reported a mean favorability score of 43.13 (with 24.37 
standard deviation) and a mean social distance rating of 3.45 (with 0.85 standard deviation). 
These raw statistics mean relatively little in and of themselves, but speak to subsequent statistical 
analysis output confirmed by simple difference of means tests (p=0.030 for favorability, showing 




 Once I confirmed that our two treatment groups matched descriptively—as established in 
the prior discussion of independent variables—I then ran individual analyses to directly test the 
effect of exposure to each treatment on favorability and social distance, respectively. 
 Given a common alpha value (p=0.05) to test for significance, I first conducted a 
bivariate regression to check for any relationship between treatment exposure and favorability 
score. This favorability measurement, one of my two dependent sub-variables, documented the 
relationship between treatment exposure and audience members’ attitudes toward the political 
content of each treatment (as used by Iyengar et al. 2012; Higgie 2017; Skoroda 2018). I found a 
p-value of 0.030, indicating enough significance to reject our null hypothesis. These results are 
graphed below in Table 4.1. Essentially, most individuals who consume late-night comedy 
television programming subsequently feel more positive about the directly presented policies and 
individuals post-exposure—a genuinely surprising cross-partisan finding further explained by 
later multivariate analyses (it is decidedly nonplussing to suggest that liberal audience members 
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would, after watching Trevor Noah eviscerate conservative policy, then be more supportive of 
said policy). 
Table 4.1—Treatment & Favorability Scale 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 43.132 2.058 —  20.960 0.000 
treatment 6.232 2.853 0.132 2.184 0.030 
  
I then ran another bivariate regression to analyze the relationship between treatment 
exposure and social distance. I received a p-value of 0.173—higher than the alpha value—
indicating a lack of significance. This model is charted in Table 4.2. Consequently, we can 
conclude that exposure to TDS does not influence audience members’ feelings toward general 
members of their opposing political party—although the B coefficient or slope is still positive, as 
anticipated, indicating some insignificant relationship between consuming TDS and exacerbated 
social distance rating. 
Table 4.2—Treatment & Social Distance Scale 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 3.447 0.076 —  45.311 0.000 
treatment 0.144 0.105 0.083 1.367 0.173 
 
Multivariate Regression Models 
 
 Though I had already established some significance between treatment exposure and 
affective polarization, I additionally ran two multivariate regressions to test the comparative 
effects of each independent variable—age, partisanship, and average late-night comedy 
consumption—on my two dependent sub-variables. These further analyses allowed me to 
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understand better both the unique, individual importance of each variable and their play on each 
other. These model tabulations are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. 
Table 4.3—Multivariate (Favorability Scale) 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) -0.424 6.150 —  -0.069 0.945 
treatment 3.368 2.309 0.071 1.459 0.146 
partisanship 27.163 2.587 0.528 10.498 0.000 
age -0.353 0.096 -0.182 -3.693 0.000 
media use 7.849 1.046 0.376 7.502 0.000 
 
I found no statistical significance between my treatment and any favorability scaling 
(p=0.146). I did, however, find significance between each of the independent variables and 
consequent individual-level affective polarization. This makes sense, considering the limitations 
of my study: it will come as no surprise to anyone that life-long partisanship identity, age, or 
repeated late-night comedy television consumption influenced participant behavior much more 
than exposure to a single three-minute video. Still, there are consequential findings from this 
endeavor—first, the older we are, the less favorable we feel about those policies or figures 
critiqued in late-night comedy television programming (indicated by a negative B coefficient). 
Second, a relatively high 7.849 B coefficient indicates that the more often individuals watch late-
night comedy, the more broadly favorable their attitudes are toward presented content—but that 
Republican viewers are much more likely to report higher favorability ratings of policies and 






Table 4.4—Multivariate (Social Distance Scale) 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 2.745 0.258 —  10.649 0.000 
treatment 0.088 0.097 0.051 0.910 0.364 
partisanship 0.456 0.108 0.241 4.208 0.000 
age -0.15 0.004 -0.217 -3.865 0.000 
media use 0.243 0.044 0.317 5.551 0.000 
 
I also failed to find any significant relationship between my treatment and audiences’ 
individual-level social distance rating (p=0.364). Still, however, each independent variable did 
significantly influence social distance ratings. Most favorability scale findings hold true here as 
well—except for one; my study indicates that the older individuals are, the lower their social 
distance rating. The negative B coefficient here suggests that younger individuals are mildly less 
comfortable interacting with members of opposing political parties than their elders, a 
fascinating finding despite its irrelevance to the immediate matter at hand. It is unclear why this 
is, although I would probably attribute it to a socio-technological generational divide. 
Summarization of Results 
 
 It is evident from these statistical analyses that exposure to late-night comedy television 
programming does moderately affect audience members’ individual-level affective political 
polarization. It is also clear, however, that watching TDS bolsters only audience members 
favorable perception of explicitly presented content, and that this relationship is markedly 
stronger among Republican viewers—there are few to no consequences for audience members’ 
relationships with members of their opposing political party. Moreover, any effects of exposure 
to TDS or similar programming are intensely mitigated by other identifying independent 
variables—age, partisan identity, and average late-night comedy television consumption.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I intended to uncover and understand the relationship between exposure to 
late-night political comedy television programming, like TDS, and audience members’ 
individual-level affective polarization. I consulted literature from both political science and 
political communication scholars to inform one key hypothesis: that there is a positive, direct, 
linear relationship between consumption of TDS and viewers’ affective polarization. I then tested 
this hypothesis using an experimental research design (specifically a Qualtrics survey published 
on Amazon’s MTurk marketplace). Participants in the survey were shown either a TDS clip or a 
manipulated transcript and consequently asked a series of questions intended to measure 
favorability and social distance (two components of affective polarization). 
This chapter is intended both to summarize the entire study, recapping my structural 
research processes, and to consider further the pragmatic consequences of my findings. I first 
highlight notably major conclusions, after which I consider the pragmatic implications of the 
study. I then discuss the challenges and limitations of my work, as well as opportunity for future 
research, before providing some final thoughts about the project. 
Major Conclusions 
 
 Initial bivariate regressions indicated a mildly significant relationship between exposure 
to TDS and audiences’ individual-level affective polarization. This relationship only holds for the 
favorability subcomponent of affective polarization, however, as there is no indication that such 
programming influences audiences’ social distance rating. Essentially, this means that late-night 
comedy television only impacts viewers’ perceptions of the political policies or figures directly 
presented and discussed in the show; TDS and similar programs do not impact audience 
members’ personal perceptions of their opposing political party counterparts. This dichotomous 
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observed relationship is almost certainly facilitated by the time-sensitive nature of the study, a 
notable methodological design flaw discussed further in a later section. 
 The dual multivariate regressions run further explicated the strength of this relationship. 
Considered alongside other powerful independent variables (age, regular media consumption, 
and partisan identity), treatment assignment did not matter—but everything else did. That is, 
these other traits were predictive of individual-level affective polarization. The older participants 
were, for instance, the less favorable they were about anything presented in their assigned 
treatment. Surprisingly, both consistent consumption of late-night comedy television and 
Republican partisanship bolstered feelings of favorability—even when media content critiqued 
their representatives and policy, Republican viewers reported much higher favorability ratings 
than their Democratic counterparts.  
 These favorability findings correspond almost identically to those from the social 
distance multivariate model, with one exception—age. Here, data suggests that the older you are, 
the lower your social distance rating. Or, in other words, younger individuals are moderately less 
comfortable interacting with members of their opposing political parties than their elders.  
Implications 
 
Political polarization is one of, if not the, most pressing threats to our contemporary 
American democracy. This fragmentation freezes governmental efficiency, holds our national 
economy hostage, and degrades public faith in key institutional powers. Moreover, it hurts us on 
a personal level, steamrolling through friendships, family ties, and potential romances.  
It is only once we understand the origin of this polarization, however, that we can begin to 
address it or protect ourselves from any potential influence. This study arose of this necessity and 
an informed guess about the power of late-night political comedy television programming. My 
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conjecture, as it turns out, was roughly correct—consuming late-night political comedy 
television does affect audiences’ perceptions of political figures and issues in a way traditional 
news media do not, even if that influence does not extend to audiences’ perception of their 
opposing political party counterparts. TDS, among similar television programming, is actively 
shaping our internal political conceptualizations. 
 I opened this study with the explicit conjecture that consuming late-night comedy 
television programming observably exacerbates viewers’ individual-level affective political 
polarization. Consequent statistical analyses proved this hypothesis only partially correct—I 
found significance for just one aspect of affective polarization—but should be treated cautiously, 
both because certain findings remain fascinatingly inexplicable (cross-partisan favorability 
significance, for instance) and because of the limitations of the employed single-exposure 
treatment method.  
 “Laughing Matters” exists as a basis for future research. Further consideration of the 
issue could simply extend this work, focusing on narrower influence (highlighting just 
favorability effects, for instance) or reworking the experiment with repeated treatment exposure, 
but could also deviate significantly. I chose to ground my work in late-night comedy television 
out of personal interest and casually observed behavior, but similar studies could—and probably 
should—be conducted on the effects of talk radio, podcasts, or any other media. 
Limitations 
 
 This research project provides an initial template, as previously mentioned, for any future 
research concerning audiences’ individual-level reaction to satirical television programming. 
Researchers interested in this issue, however, should spend time constructing more reliable 
measurement; running Cronbach’s Alpha tests for each affective polarization subscale revealed 
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flawed question groupings. Essentially, certain questions (i.e., “How comfortable would you be 
with your child or a close family member marrying someone from your opposing political 
party?”) used in this study do not all measure their intended effect well, and further reflection 
and editing would be beneficial. For instance, replacing questions grounded in individual social 
scenarios with questions about partisan perception—asking about emotional state rather than 
hypothetical behavior—might yield better results. 
 Moreover, the partisan nature of my treatment content posed an interesting challenge. 
Ideally, I would have included both liberally-biased and a conservatively-biased late-night 
comedy television content. Unfortunately, it was incredibly difficult to find any substantive 
contemporary television program presenting conservative political comedy, which necessitated a 
decidedly more partisan methodological structure. 
 In addition to flawed measurement construction and partisan treatment challenges, 
formatting and medium became evidently problematic throughout this study. Though the 
‘control’ transcript attributed to Anderson Cooper matched the TDS clip verbatim, there is still 
undeniably a pronounced difference between watching a performance and just reading the 
particular words used. Tone, body language, and other presentational elements are all vital to 
messaging interpretation. 
 I would also like to address one other intensely significant shortcoming of the project: 
time frame. Ideally, this study would have measured the effects of prolonged or repeated 
exposure to TDS content over a longer period. This is a complicated observation to make in a 
real-world setting, however, because of the abundance of other potential intervening or 
moderating variables that complicate causation. Furthermore, the academic time constraints 
placed upon the project made any prolonged or repeated treatment virtually impossible. 
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Ultimately, it is highly likely that a one-time exposure treatment is not enough to observe any 
significant relationship or effect. This shortcoming is especially pertinent to the social distance 
aspect of affective polarization, as repeated exposure to TDS or similar programming is virtually 
guaranteed to shape personal social behavior more than exposure to a single video. 
Final Thoughts 
 
This project and its statistical analyses paint a picture of a country divided by much more 
than media consumption, though exposure to certain programming does matter. These findings 
point to the importance of personal identity in affective polarization—including both partisan 
identity and age—and consequently suggest that our political thought and behavior are dictated 
by those traits we use to define ourselves. This confirms the value of social identity theory—
referenced much earlier in my literature review—and means any effort we make to resolve 
polarization must begin with collective reflection of our own deep-rooted principles and 
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Table 3.1—Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY THE COLLEGE OF WOOSTER 
Political Media Consumption  
Principal Investigator: Nicholas Shereikis 
 
Purpose 
You are being asked to participate in an independent research study. This survey is intended to 




If you decide to participate, you will be asked to consume a brief piece of political media content 




There are no direct or indirect risks associated with participation in this survey.  
 
Benefits  
Following completion of the survey, you will be credited $0.25 to your MTurk account. 
 
Confidentiality 
Any information you give will be held confidential. All data will be stored on a password 
protected Microsoft Word file, and reported in aggregate form only. This file will be deleted 
once all data is collected.  
 
Costs  
There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort required to complete the survey described 
above.  
 
Right to Refuse or Withdraw  
You may refuse to participate in the survey. If you decide to participate, you may change your 
mind about being in the study and withdraw at any point during the process.  
 
Questions  
If you have any questions, you can contact me by email at nshereikis20@wooster.edu. You may 
also contact my advisor, Dr. Angie Bos, at abos@wooster.edu.  
 
Consent  
By continuing, you are indicating that you have decided to participate in this survey, that you 




Table 3.2—TDS Treatment Transcript 
 
TREVOR NOAH: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump, 
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how 
impenetrable his border wall is.  
 
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said 
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like 
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all 
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through 
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need 
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?  
 
NOAH: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall because if 
the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by yelling, ‘Marco’ 
and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t named Marco. A lot 
of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal voice): But, yes, on 
Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can get through his wall. 
And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh, well, cut right to the 
next scene.  
 
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly 
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known 
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when 
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete 
barriers within minutes.  
 
NOAH: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that 
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at 
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the 
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they 
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah, 
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle 
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch. 
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think 
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable 
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people 
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s 
response.  
 
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh, 
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s 
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk 




NOAH: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be 
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In 
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally 
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also, 
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it 
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed. 
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border. 
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close 
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!” 
 




Table 3.4—Narrative (attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper) 
 
ANDERSON COOPER: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump, 
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how 
impenetrable his border wall is.  
 
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said 
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like 
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all 
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through 
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need 
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?  
 
COOPER: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall 
because if the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by 
yelling, ‘Marco’ and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t 
51 
 
named Marco. A lot of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal 
voice): But, yes, on Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can 
get through his wall. And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh, 
well, cut right to the next scene.  
 
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly 
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known 
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when 
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete 
barriers within minutes.  
 
COOPER: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that 
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at 
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the 
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they 
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah, 
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle 
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch. 
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think 
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable 
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people 
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s 
response.  
 
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh, 
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s 
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk 
back in. But we have a very powerful wall. But you can cut through any wall.  
 
COOPER: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be 
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In 
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally 
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also, 
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it 
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed. 
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border. 
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close 
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!” 
 
Table 3.5—Affective Polarization Measurement 
 
Favorability  2. How do you feel about President Trump? 1-100 feeling thermometer  
    scale.  
3. How do you feel about President Trump’s border wall construction? 1- 
    100 feeling thermometer scale.  
4. How do you feel about Trevor Noah? 1-100 feeling thermometer scale. 
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Social Distance 5. How high a threat do you think your opposing political party poses to  
    our country? Extremely low/moderately low/nonexistent or  
    unsure/moderately high/extremely high.  
6. How comfortable would you be with your child or a close family  
    member marrying someone from your opposing political party?  
    Extremely uncomfortable/moderately uncomfortable/neither  
    uncomfortable nor comfortable/moderately comfortable/extremely  
    comfortable.  
7. How often do you consider the partisanship of potential connections  
    when establishing friendships or relationships?  
    Never/infrequently/unsure/frequently/always.  
8. How confident are you in your opposing political party’s ability to lead  
    our country? Extremely unconfident/moderately unconfident/neutral/ 
    moderately confident/extremely confident.  
9. How likely are you to discuss this issue with a member of your  
    opposing political party? Extremely unlikely/somewhat unlikely/neither  
    unlikely nor likely/somewhat likely/extremely likely. 
 
Table 3.6—Content & Demographics Measurement 
 
Content  1. Which of the following best describes the issue addressed in this news  
    messaging? Obamacare is failing; smugglers are breaking through  
    President Trump’s border wall; impeachment hearings are delayed;      
    economic downturn is killing small businesses. 
 
Demographics           10. How old are you, in years? Fill in the blank. 
             11. How often do you watch The Daily Show or other satirical news  
    programs? Frequently/often/sometimes/rarely/never.  
          12. Choose the option that best describes your political affiliation. Strong  
    Democrat/leans Democrat/independent or unaffiliated/leans  
    Republican/strong Republican. 
 
Table 3.7—Debrief Text 
 
Thank you again for your participation in this study. The purpose of this investigation is to 
determine if and how exposure to late-night political comedy television programming alters 
viewer perception of political polarization. To accurately reflect the late-night political comedy 
television landscape, treatment included only The Daily Show segments containing liberal bias 
as well as a control message, or written delivery of the same information falsely attributed to 
CNN’s Anderson Cooper. You were randomly shown one piece of mediated content, and 
consequently asked questions designed to measure your emotional state and sense of political 
polarization. I anticipate that participants shown late-night comedy television programming will 
report higher feels of anger and hostility, as well as political polarization, than those exposed to 
written content attributed to mainstream press. Thank you again for your participation. If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact either me at 
nshereikis20@wooster.edu or my advisor, Dr. Angie Bos, at abos@wooster.edu. 
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Table 4.1—Treatment & Favorability Scale 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 43.132 2.058 —  20.960 0.000 
treatment 6.232 2.853 0.132 2.184 0.030 
 
Table 4.2—Treatment & Social Distance Scale 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 3.447 0.076 —  45.311 0.000 
treatment 0.144 0.105 0.083 1.367 0.173 
 
Table 4.3—Multivariate (Favorability Scale) 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) -0.424 6.150 —  -0.069 0.945 
treatment 3.368 2.309 0.071 1.459 0.146 
partisanship 27.163 2.587 0.528 10.498 0.000 
age -0.353 0.096 -0.182 -3.693 0.000 
media use 7.849 1.046 0.376 7.502 0.000 
 
Table 4.4—Multivariate (Social Distance Scale) 
 
 unstandardized coefficients standardized 
coefficient 
 
 B std. error beta t p-value 
(constant) 2.745 0.258 —  10.649 0.000 
treatment 0.088 0.097 0.051 0.910 0.364 
partisanship 0.456 0.108 0.241 4.208 0.000 
age -0.15 0.004 -0.217 -3.865 0.000 
media use 0.243 0.044 0.317 5.551 0.000 
 
